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MEDIATION AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: 
A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
WANG Guiguo∗ and HE Xiaoli∗∗ 
The most important feature of the contemporary world is globalization with a 
high degree of economic interdependence among nations, which includes breaking 
down national economic barriers as well as the increasing cross-border economic 
exchanges and transactions of goods, services, and capital, not only in a large scale 
but also at a high frequency.  The spread of market economy across the globe has 
created a global market, which effectively allocates resources and distributes them 
at a global level.  It was the development of technology relating to information, 
transportation, and communications, such as the internet and teleconferencing, that 
enabled the effective and smooth transnational transactions and exchanges at 
reduced transaction costs.  
Globalization is a dynamic process that involves the flow of goods, services, 
capital, and technology, as well as culture.  Meanwhile, it also promotes the 
homogeneity and interaction of different cultures.  Understanding different cultures 
is vital for global business, including investment.  Ignorance of cultural dimension 
may lead to difficulty, if not impossibility, in achieving successful business.  Apart 
from the lack of awareness of different cultures, insufficient communication 
between transaction parties also causes misunderstandings and conflicts.1  It is 
possible, for instance, for a Chinese company to sign a contract with no 
understanding of its terms.  Moreover, discrepant conceptions of different people, 
organizations, and governments are also major sources of conflicts. 
A significant aspect of international economic exchanges is investment, which 
has become part of development policies of many countries.  In fact, some of the 
regimes may even rely on foreign direct investment for their effective control.  In 
these circumstances, most countries, if not all, try to improve their investment 
environment by accepting, inter alia, investor-state arbitration in order to compete 
for foreign direct investment.  However, recent arbitration decisions are not up to 
the expectations, to say the least, of investment host countries.  This article 
analyzes the contemporary issues relating to international investment, and 
considers whether mediation can serve as an alternative for resolving investment 
disputes.  In this regard, it will examine the Chinese culture and practice in 
resolving disputes involving foreign investors and the Chinese government to 
determine if the Chinese experience could be adopted as an Asian value in 
promoting foreign direct investment. 
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 1. For discussion on the differences of contract practice, see generally Philip J. McConnaughay, 
Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 
427 (2001), and Chunlin Leonhard, Beyond the Four Corners of a Written Contract: A Global 
Challenge to U.S. Contract Law, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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I.  ISSUES OF GLOBALIZED INVESTMENT LAW 
Internationalized commercial activities call for compatible legal norms to 
resolve conflicts and disputes.  Theoretically, such norms can be divided into 
international and national norms.2  However, such dichotomy has failed to fully 
correspond to reality.  Especially in this era of globalization, the relationship 
between international law and domestic law is dynamic, diversified, and 
complicated.  The territorially-based conception of Westphalian sovereignty in 
traditional international law is now facing challenges from the contemporary world, 
in particular by globalization.3  The increased transnational economic transactions 
and arrangements, and corresponding interdependence of states, make it impossible 
for an individual government to assert control over a discrete territory without 
cooperating with others to cope with global problems such as infectious diseases 
and poverty reduction.4 
International law of the contemporary world is transprocedural and 
transsubstantive in nature.  In the current circumstances, public and private actors 
including nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, 
nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals all contribute to the 
transnational legal process by either making, implementing, or interpreting relevant 
norms.  Process has the effect of both domesticating international norms and 
internalizing national norms.5  Again within the process, private individuals sit as 
arbitrators and make binding decisions on states, which was unheard of before.  
Like judges, private arbitrators must give their own understanding of the treaty 
provisions by accepting one party’s opinion and rejecting the other party’s opinion.  
By doing so, they are making new norms out of such treaty provisions, a process 
Professor Cover described as “jurisgenerative.”6  The interaction between these 
public and private actors generates laws and interpretations of laws and internalizes 
them into domestic law.7  It is equally true that where the parties submit their 
disputes to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, they hand their fate to such bodies.8  
Through interpretation of international treaties, arbitrators impose their own 
understanding of the provisions upon the parties, regardless of whether their 
understanding reflects the true meaning of the treaty provisions.9  
                                                                                                     
 2. J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 66, 
66 (1936). 
 3. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 283, 283 (2004). 
 4. Id. at 285. 
 5. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2649 
(1997). 
 6. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (describing a “jurisgenerative process” as one in which interpretive communities 
“create law and . . . give meaning to law through their narratives and precepts.”).  
 7. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 186 (1996). 
 8. See Cover, supra note 6, at 53 (calling judges “people of violence” as they always kill off one of 
the arguments, and consequentially “jurispathic”).  Arbitrators of today do exactly what judges do in 
courts insofar as international commercial arbitration is concerned.  
 9. See generally Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 
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In judicial and quasi-judicial interpretation, it is common that confusing and 
contradicting rulings are made in respect to the same provisions:  
We often see not only different courts but the Judges of the came [sic] court 
differing from each other.  To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result 
from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all 
nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, 
possessing a general superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the 
last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.10  
This is particularly true in the practice of the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).11  For instance, in interpreting the 
umbrella clause, one ICSID tribunal held it could not transform a contractual claim 
into a treaty claim, but another came to the opposite conclusion.  In SGS v. 
Pakistan, apart from denying the elevation effect of the umbrella clause, the 
tribunal expressed the concern that an overly broad interpretation of the standard 
would be susceptible to “almost indefinite expansion” and would lead to claims 
that were “so automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their operation, [and] so 
burdensome in their potential impact” upon sovereign states.12  It held that there 
must be “clear and convincing evidence” of a shared intent of states to transform 
contract breaches into treaty claims.13  Nevertheless, the tribunal in SGS v. 
Philippines, the facts of which were similar to those of SGS v. Pakistan, held that 
the umbrella clause must be construed to favor the protection of covered 
investments.14 
The divergence of ICSID tribunals also took place in determining the 
applicability of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause to dispute settlement 
issues.  The tribunal in Maffezini v. Spain ruled that the goal of the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) in question was investor protection and that dispute 
settlement arrangements were inextricably related to the protection of foreign 
investors; therefore the MFN clause could be extended to procedural matters, 
including dispute resolution provisions.15  Such an expansive interpretation was 
                                                                                                     
(2005) (discussing the inconsistency in arbitration decision making with regard to international treaty 
dispute resolution). 
 10. Cover, supra note 6, at 41 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 148-49 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(E. Bourne, ed., 1947)). 
 11. In order to restore the legitimacy of investment disputes resolution, some scholars suggested 
establishing some appeal mechanism.  See generally Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 
10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179 (2005); Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID 
Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 444 
(2006); David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State 
Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39 (2006). 
 12. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 166-67 (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005). 
 13. Id. at ¶ 167. 
 14. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).  
 15. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 56 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). 
2012] MEDIATION AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 219 
followed in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina,16 Gas Natural v. Argentina,17Tecmed v. 
Mexico,18 and Vivendi v. Argentina.19 
Nevertheless, in Salini v. Jordan, the tribunal refused to accept the investor’s 
plea and refused jurisdiction over the primary, citing the MFN clause.20  In its view, 
the base treaty did not expressly provide that the MFN clause would apply to 
dispute resolution and there was no indication that the parties intended the clause to 
apply to dispute resolution issues.21  Similarly, the Plama v. Bulgaria tribunal 
rejected the expansive interpretation of the MFN clause adopted by the Maffezini 
tribunal.22  It asserted that “doubts as to the parties’ clear and unambiguous 
intention [could] arise if the agreement to arbitrate [was] to be reached by 
incorporation by reference.”23  The tribunal held that the MFN clause should not 
apply to dispute settlement except when there was a clear intention of the parties.24  
In more recent cases, the Telefónica tribunal regarded the local remedy 
requirement “as a temporary bar to the initiation of arbitration” or a matter of 
inadmissibility which “would result in the Tribunal’s temporary lack of 
jurisdiction.”25  The Wintershall tribunal regarded BIT provisions relating to 
dispute settlement as comprising a standing offer of the host state, in which “the 
eighteen-month requirement of a proceeding before local courts . . . [was] an 
essential preliminary step to the institution of ICSID Arbitration.”26  Therefore, in 
order to access ICSID arbitration, the investor must accept the entire terms of the 
standing offer and first satisfy the local remedy requirement.  In the end, the 
tribunal in Wintershall also found the recourse to local court proceedings to be a 
matter that was jurisdictional in nature.27 
                                                                                                     
 16. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
103 (Aug. 3, 2004), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC508_En&caseId=C7. 
 17. Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Preliminary 
Questions on Jurisdiction, ¶ 47 (June 17, 2005), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf. 
 18. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 69 (May 29, 2003), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC602_En&caseId=C186. 
 19. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 62 (Aug. 3, 2006), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0819.pdf. 
 20. Salini Construttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 114-19 (Nov. 29, 2004), 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 148 
(2005). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 (Feb. 8, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 262 (2005). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at ¶ 223. 
 25. Telefonica S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Decision of the Tribunal 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 93 (May 25, 2006), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/DecisiononJurisdictionTelefonica.pdf. 
 26. Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 
160 (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/documents/Wintershall.pdf. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 172. 
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Where decisions by the tribunals outside the ICSID regime are taken into 
account, conflicts are unavoidable in tribunal rulings over essentially the same 
facts.  These contradicting arbitration decisions in practice have significantly 
reduced the attraction of arbitration as a means for resolving investment disputes.  
Some of the host countries reacted strongly to the situation of investment 
arbitration by withdrawing from ICSID Convention.  For example, Bolivia 
withdrew in 2007,28 Ecuador in 2009,29 and Venezuela in 2012.30 
At the same time, as the second-largest foreign direct investment (FDI) 
recipient (after the United States), attracting around $95 billion in 2009 according 
to the World Investment Report 2010,31 China is almost immune from investor-
state arbitration, either as investor or host state.32  There could be many reasons for 
this.  Yet, among all the possible reasons, traditional Chinese culture, which still 
has tremendous influence in modern China, has most contributed to the amicable 
settlement of disputes.  Non-litigation methods for resolving disputes, such as 
consultation and mediation, are the culturally preferred means and are better suited 
to the Chinese environment.  Among numerous considerations from the cultural 
perspective, praise of harmony usually comes first.  This has actually been the 
common theme of all the major traditional Chinese schools of thought that provide 
the philosophical foundation for contemporary views and ways of approaching 
disputes.33  The traditional view is that disputes, whatever their reasons, are serious 
                                                                                                     
 28. John L. Gardiner, Barry H. Garfinkel, Bolivia Withdraws From the ICSID Convention and 
Venezuela May Follow Suit: Implications For Investors, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOOM 
LLP & AFFILIATES (May 2007), 
http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Publications1267_0.pdf.   
 29. Press Release, Ecuador Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (July 9, 
2009), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageTy
pe=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20.  
 30. Press Release, Venezuela Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (Jan. 6, 
2012) 
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageT
ype=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement100).  See also 
n24fuenteno, Ministro Ramírez sobre el Ciadi.mp4 (Jan. 15, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=rpgUXj5CmbA (video of the Minister of 
Energy and Petroleum of Venezuela announcing Venezuela’s intention to withdraw from the ICSID 
Convention in an interview on Jan. 15, 2012) (Venez.). 
 31. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2010: INVESTING IN A 
LOW CARBON ECONOMY, fig. 1.4 at 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2010, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.2 
(2010).  
 32. Contra Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Laudo [Award], ¶¶ 59-
60 (July 7, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/TzaYapShumAward.pdf (Tza Yap Sum, a Chinese 
national, commenced ICSID arbitration against the Republic of Peru, claiming violations of the BIT 
affecting his investment).  See also Ekran Berhad v. China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15, Pending (July 
22, 2011), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=ListCases&caseId=C
1600&actionVal=viewCase (a Malaysian company filed the first-ever case against the Chinese 
government before ICSID, but that case was “suspended” on 12 July 2011 “pursuant to the parties’ 
agreement”). 
 33. Gao Jun, Long Yiping & Xu Hongwei, Revelations of Traditional Chinese Non-legal-dispute 
Culture on Construction of Contemporary Harmonious Chinese Society, 23 JOURNAL OF HUBEI 
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challenges to harmony and good relationships among people within the society.34  
Confucianism, the dominant cultural influence in Chinese society for over two 
thousand years, strongly discourages social conflicts because of their “possible 
obstruction with the natural order of life and other intrinsic disharmonious 
principles.”35 
II. MEDIATION AS PART OF CHINESE CULTURE 
Mediation as a traditional form of dispute resolution can be found in societies 
around the globe and can be traced back to the earliest history of mankind.36  As 
early as about 3,000 BCE, this amicable resolution of disputes has existed in Egypt, 
Babel, and Assyria.37 
The mediation system in China, the so-called “oriental experience,” is an 
integral part of the ancient tradition of the Chinese legal culture.38  It can be dated 
back to early ancient times, or the Rao and Shun times around 4,000 years ago, 
according to the “Chronicles of Five Emperors” contained in the Historical Records 
of Sima Qian.39  Although there was no state and no law in primitive society, there 
were disputes for which resolution was always achieved by one of two means: 
peace or violence.40  Violence here naturally refers to force, but many disputes were 
solved by negotiation between the parties or between the heads of the tribes.41  This 
might be the oldest and simplest form of mediation.  
As a means of dispute settlement, mediation survived from the pre-Qin Period 
(before 221 BCE) to the Ming and Qing Periods (1368-1911 CE).42  According to 
the records, nearly all civil and minor criminal cases were resolved by mediation, 
and only if mediation failed were these cases adjudicated by the relevant laws and 
rules.43  The inscriptions found on some cultural relics of the Western Zhou Period 
(1029-771 BCE) record the whole process of handling civil cases, and some 
                                                                                                     
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONALITIES (PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES), no. 4, 2005, at 53, 53 (original in 
Chinese). 
 34. Id. 
 35. George O. White III, Navigating the Cultural Malaise: Foreign Direct Investment Dispute 
Resolution in the People’s Republic of China, 5 TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 55, 64 (2003).  
 36. Jacob Bercovitch, Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEFFREY Z. RUBIN 3, 4 (Jacob Bercovitch, ed. 2002).  
 37. CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS 177 (2nd ed. 2006). 
 38. Zhou Xue, Interpretation of Chinese Traditional Mediation System, JOURNAL OF SUZHOU 
EDUCATION INSTITUTE, Oct. 2006, at 19, 20 (original in Chinese). 
 39. Xiao Chuanlin & Yang Jun, Carry on Mediation Tradition and Construct Harmonious Society, 
25 JOURNAL OF ADULT EDUCATION SCHOOL OF HUBEI UNIVERSITY, Apr. 2007, at 53-4 (original in 
Chinese). 
 40. Lian Hong, Harmonious Concept of Confucianism and Chinese Traditional Mediation System, 
18 CHANG CHUN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (SOCIAL SCIENCES), no. 2, 2005, at 89, 91 
(original in Chinese). 
 41. Hu Xuzui & Xia Xinhua, Research of the China's Mediation Tradition--A Cultural Perspective, 
JOURNAL OF HENAN ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND LAW, Apr. 2000, at 21 (original in 
Chinese). 
 42. Lian, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
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provisions of the mediation system are even spelled out.44  During that time, 
officeholders were appointed to be in charge of settling disputes between people by 
mediation.45 
Thereafter, the role of mediation was increasingly emphasized, especially after 
the Western Han Period (206-9 BCE) when Confucianism became an orthodox 
legal system, and there was a need to employ morality to settle the arguments 
whose cases often appear in the ancient books and records.46  In the Song47 and 
Yuan periods48 (960-1368 CE), this system saw a rapid development.  In the 
Statutes of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuan dianzhang 元典章), there is a special chapter 
on “Proceedings,” which regards mediation as having the same legal effect as a 
court proceeding, providing that any case officially handled by mediation cannot be 
later submitted to a court.49  In the Qing Period (1644-1911 CE), the mediation 
system was further improved and perfected and was divided into two forms: 
prefecture and county mediation, and folk mediation.50 
The emergence and development of the mediation system in China has deep 
social and ideological origins.  First of all, mediation is not only a way of settling 
disputes, it embodies distinct cultural values.  In the Chinese tradition, the idea of 
“harmony” is in conformity with mediation; in one sense, traditional Chinese 
mediation is the result of Chinese culture and its concept of harmony.51  One  
feature of harmony is the avoidance of suits or adversarial proceedings.52  This is 
the ultimate orientation of values and the guiding principle of governance. 
All of the main schools of thought in China—Taoism, Legalism, 
Confucianism, and Mohism—preach the idea of non-adversarial settlement of 
disputes.53  Lao Tzu, the father of Taoism, sought a realm of “wu-wei” or inaction, 
meaning to “follow the flow of nature,” or to go with the flow.54  The reflection of 
this idea in relation to litigation is that if people do not struggle for fame and power 
there might be no suits among them and the world would be at peace.  On the other 
                                                                                                     
 44. Xiaobing Xu, Different Mediation Traditions: A Comparison Between China and the U.S., 16 
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 515, 525 (2005). 
 45. Zhou Ying, Study on Chinese Traditional Mediation System, FA ZHI YUAN DI: FA ZHI YU SHE 
HUI [LEGAL SYSTEM: LEGAL SYSTEM AND SOCIETY], Sept. 2007, at 76, 76 (original in Chinese). 
 46. WANG CHENGUANG, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW § 
1.03, at 4 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xiancu, eds., 1997). 
 47. See Xiaobing, supra note 42, at 529. 
 48. See id. at 527. 
 49. See id. at 523 (explaining that under the Yuan Code, if a court allowed the voluntary withdrawal 
of a civil lawsuit because the parties chose to settle through private mediation, then the court was to 
refuse to accept a new lawsuit on the same dispute by the same parties unless the court found that the 
mediation or resolution in the case had been “unreasonable”). 
 50. Wu Zeyong, The Reform of Civil Procedural System as part of the Amendment to Legal Systems 
in the Late Qing, STUDY OF COMP. L., no. 3, 2003, at 72, 74 (original in Chinese). 
 51. See generally Bobby K Y Wong, Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution, 30 
HONG KONG L.J. 304 (2000). 
 52. Id. at 306-07. 
 53. Shao Aihong, Brief Comment on the Idea of No Litigation, J. E. CHINA U. POL. & L., no. 1, 
1998, at 66, 66 (original in Chinese). 
 54. See Eric Neigher, The Thousand Mile Journey: Taoism and Western Legal Philosophy, 76 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 663, 669-70 (2003). 
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hand, the aggressive Legalists insisted on severe punishment, believing that if 
lesser crimes were heavily sentenced nobody would dare to commit even minor 
crimes.55  If there are no misdemeanors, of course, serious offenses are unlikely to 
crop up.  In this way, people can live in a state of no struggles and no suits. 
Although both Confucianism and Legalism share the same aspiration of no 
struggle, the idea of no suits was first put forward by Confucius, the founder of 
Confucianism.56  Through his lecturing and lobbying in different states, Confucius 
considered that the ideal condition of the world is a harmonious society and that the 
concept of “no suits” is one of its necessary features.57  Based on his system of 
“ren” (benevolence, love, kindheartedness, or humanity),58 he conceived the way of 
punishing criminals by morality, e.g., by finding a reasonable “du” (grade or point), 
between the passive inaction of Taoism and the severe punishment of Legalism.  In 
the view of Confucianism, “de” (morality) and “li” (etiquette or observance of 
rules) can work effectively to govern the populace and make citizens shameful 
when committing crimes and thus obey the ruler.59  An emphasis on the observance 
of etiquette can help inspire the internal consciousness of the people and make the 
external regulation of etiquette become an internal demand, thus realizing the aim 
of “no suits.” 
Confucius’ ideas continue to exert great influence upon the thinking of the 
Chinese people.  Ordinary people perceive disputes and social order as being in 
opposition to each other, and they often consider suits to be shameful and litigation 
to be synonymous with demoralization and breakdown in morality.60  According to 
Hexagram 6 (Song) of the I Ching, litigation is to be avoided; rather, individuals 
are encouraged to seek harmony.61 
  Traditional Chinese society was agriculturally oriented.62  On the basis of 
self-sufficiency and the demands of a small farming economy, the ancient society 
                                                                                                     
 55. GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 4 (1996); WANG 
CHENGUANG, supra note 46.  See also Kevin C. Clark, The Philosophical Underpinning and General 
Workings of Chinese Mediation Systems: What Lessons Can American Mediators Learn?, 2 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 117, 118-19 (2002). 
 56. See Jiefeng Lu, Curb Your Enthusiasm: A Note on Employment Discrimination Lawsuits in 
China, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 211, 223 (2011). 
 57. See Cao Pei, The Origins of Mediation in Traditional China, DISP. RESOL. J., May 1999, at 32, 
34. 
 58. See Herbert H.P. Ma, The Chinese Concept of the Individual and the Reception of Foreign Law, 
9 J. CHINESE L. 207, 209 (1995) (explaining that “ren,’ . . . has been translated as ‘good,’ ‘benevolence,’ 
or ‘humanity,’ [and] is generally regarded as the summation of all virtues”). 
 59. Irene Bloom, Confucius and the Analects, in 1 SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 41, 46 (Wm. 
Theodore de Bary ed., 2nd ed. 1999) (translating one of the Confucian Analects to read, “[l]ead them by 
means of regulations and keep order among them through punishment, and the people will evade them 
and will lack any sense of shame.  Lead them though moral force (de) and keep order among them 
through rites (li), and they will have a sense of shame and will also correct themselves”).  See also Cao, 
supra note 57, at 35 (explaining that communities felt “ashamed” if lawsuits were frequently brought 
because they viewed them as “vulgar and immoral”). 
 60. See Cao, supra note 57, at 35. 
 61. Tuck Chang, Hexagram Song, UNVEILING THE MYSTERY OF THE I-CHING, 
http://www.iching123.com/6_text.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 62. He Ran & Gong He, The Culture Source of People’s Mediate System of Our Country, 20 J. 
CHANGCHUN U. SCI. & TECH. (SOC. SCI. EDITION), at 39, 41 (May 2007) (original in Chinese). 
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was a patriarchal one linked by blood relationships.63  In this society, parent-child 
relationships and other blood relationships played an extremely important role.64  
This eventually led to the concept of the oneness of state and family, which posits 
that political society is the extension of family and such concepts as “clan, state, 
world” are the extension of families.65  In this sense, state affairs can be understood 
as family affairs, and the rules of the state are the extension of family rules.66  If 
oneness of state is considered as oneness of family, civil strife or citizen’s lawsuits 
can be regarded as an extension of a lack of family harmony.67  The basic value 
underlying this concept is that people should live in peace and harmony.68  
In addition, this created a legal culture where living in peace and kindness was 
foremost, and these principles served as important standards for evaluating the 
achievements of officeholders in their handling of cases by mediation.69  If there 
should be more cases cropping up in a region, this would mean that the 
officeholders there lacked morality and their achievements were poor.70  To achieve 
“harmony,” the ruler must educate the people to live in peace and kindness and 
emphasize the bad sides of lawsuits as well as the good sides of mediation.71  At the 
same time, the ruler must try to limit the number of lawsuits by encouraging 
mediation.72  Therefore, in their practice, local officeholders often took mediation 
as a prior consideration even though there was no definite provision in the ancient 
Chinese laws establishing mediation as a required procedure.73 
According to The History of the Song Dynasty, Lu Jiuyuan, a famous scholar, 
always encouraged that lawsuits be settled by mediation between the parties and, 
when the disputes were among family members, advised that Confucian doctrines 
could be turned to.74  In the Ming Period, Hai Rui, an official known for his honest 
and upright character, viewed litigation as socially unhealthy and a sign of moral 
degradation in the community.75  In order to restrict lawsuits, he required that 
“minor matters relating to the family,” such as those concerning marriages, land, 
                                                                                                     
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Xu, supra note 44, at 524 (“[O]fficial policies discouraged civil lawsuits and the number of 
lawsuits in a region was linked to the performance of an official in charge of that region, officials at all 
levels often referred civil cases back to private or semi-administrative mediation or were themselves 
active in settling civil cases by mediation.”). 
 70. T’UNG-TSU CH’Ü, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 252 (1961).  See also Xu, supra 
note 44, at 531 (stating that when lawsuits were brought before officials, some of them would blame 
themselves for moral failings). 
 71. Zhou Biaolong, Legal Thought of No Litigation and Its Enlightenment to the Construction of 
Harmonious Society, CHUANSHAN J., no.1, 2008, at 197, 197 (original in Chinese). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Albert H. Y. Chen, Mediation, Litigation, and Justice: Confucian Reflections in a Modern 
Liberal Society, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE MODERN WORLD 257, 266 (Daniel A. Bell & Hahm 
Chaibong eds., 2003).  See also Cao, supra note 57, at 33. 
 75. Chen, supra note 74, at 267-68. 
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and debts, be handled through mediation; adjudication by the magistrate was only 
available in the event that mediation failed.76 
The Qing Dynasty shortened the period in which parties could bring 
complaints and also established the scope of lawsuits.77  Generally speaking, 
mediation was applied in handling such civil disputes and minor criminal cases 
such as marriages, land, fighting, conflicts, etc.78  Mediation, however, could not be 
applied to serious cases such as robbery, murder, and so on.79  For instance, the 
Yuan Code provided  that community leaders were responsible for mediating minor 
civil disputes, minimizing the number of lawsuits, and ensuring that land was not 
wasted.80 
As a non-lawsuit dispute settlement mechanism, mediation has inherited the 
ancient Chinese cultural and social functions and has evolved in both form and 
content.  From the Western Zhou Period to the Ming and Qing Periods, it evolved 
from simply one means of solving social conflicts to become an important tool for 
the ruler to implement the etiquette system and education through morality.81  As 
such, it came to possess striking political functions.  As a legal phenomenon, the 
evolution of traditional mediation has had a great effect on the construction of the 
modern Chinese mediation system. 
Traditional culture and its associated legal thinking continue to have a strong 
influence on the current legal system in China.  This is also true with regard to the 
tradition of preferring mediation as a means of resolving disputes.  The formal 
appearance of the mediation system as an independent article in the civil procedural 
law can be found in the Civil Procedural Law issued by the Kuomintang 
Government in 1935.82  This statute explicitly covered the scope, time limits, 
organization, methods, and outcomes of mediation.83  The enactment of this law 
marks the beginning of mediation in China in modern times.84 
 
                                                                                                     
 76. Id., at 268. 
 77. See Guan Xing, The Qing Specific Judicial System, CHINACOURT.ORG (Sept. 19, 2011, 5:42pm) 
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=94419 (China). 
 78. See 1 JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE TO FOREIGN-INVESTED 
ENTERPRISES 41 (3d ed. 2005) (suggesting that the courts of ancient China rarely exercised jurisdiction 
over civil cases, for these cases were traditionally settled through mediation or arbitration).  See also Xu, 
supra note 44, at 527. 
 79. See generally R.P. Peerenboom, The Victim in Chinese Criminal Theory and Practice: A 
Historical Survey, 7 J. CHINESE L. 63, 97-8 (1993) (“Confucianism has always recognized that the state 
must step in when the informal system fails, as in the case of murder and other violent crimes, and when 
the state itself is threatened, as in the case of treason and public property damage. Once forced to 
intervene, the state must attempt damage control.  In most instances, the opportunity to restore 
harmony, . . . [which] never existed . . . in the case of rape or murder, . . . [t]he focus shifts from 
restoration of harmony to deterrence of future behavior and punishment for past misdeeds.”). 
 80. Xu, supra note 44, at 527 
 81. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 78, at 37; Cao, supra note 57. 
 82. The Code of Civil Procedure (promulgated on Feb. 1, 1935, effective July 1, 1935), art. 416 in 
LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: FIRST SERIES—MAJOR LAWS 676 (Law Revision Planning Grp. et. 
al., trans., 1961). 
 83. See id. arts. 409-430. 
 84. Lian, supra note 40. 
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The modern mediation system continued to evolve during the first and second 
Chinese civil wars.  Prior to the Anti-Japanese War, mediation was mainly 
employed by local governments at the grass-roots level,85 but during the period 
1937–1941 it became institutionalized.86  Local governments at various levels in 
the revolutionary base areas worked out a series of rules and regulations concerning 
mediation and, after the end of the civil war, mediation was formally introduced 
into New China and was paid high attention.87 
In 1958, on the basis of the Supreme People’s Court’s Summary of Civil Case 
Adjudication Procedures of the People’s Court, the Chinese government 
established the basic policy for civil adjudication, stating that it should involve 
investigation, research, and mediation oriented settlement of disputes.88  The 
significance of this policy was its stress on mediation but not on proceedings, 
advocating settlement of disputes by mediation.  Western scholars think of 
mediation in China between the 1950s and the 1970s as Maoist, characterized by its 
political function during the period.89  This period (from the founding of New 
China in 1949 to the enactment of the Civil Procedural Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (Trial Implementation) in 1982) is generally seen as the first 
period of China’s modern mediation system.90 
China’s legal system, including its legal provisions on mediation, has not 
failed to be affected by its economic exchanges with the rest of the highly-
globalized world.  Since the 1980s, and after its 30-year-experience with the “open 
door policy,” China has undergone rapid economic growth.91  It had roughly 2% of 
world gross domestic product in 1978, but that had grown to approximately 9.4% 
                                                                                                     
 85. See JAMES P. BRADY, JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN PEOPLE’S CHINA: LEGAL ORDER OR 
CONTINUING REVOLUTION? 68-69 (1982) (explaining that China transitioned from a mediation system 
meant to “soothe tempers and preserve the folkways of the local private government” to “Communist 
mediation,” which “meshed socialist ideology with ancient practice”). 
 86. See Fu Hualing, Understanding People's Mediation in Post-Mao China, 6 J. CHINESE L. 211, 
213 n. 12 (1992) (“[M]ediation in Communist China is systematized and institutionalized, and carried 
out in accordance with the new political standard.”). 
 87. See Chin Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal System, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1413, 1431-32 (1987) 
(explaining that mediation was made formal by the implementation of the 1954 Provisional Organic 
Rules, and in 1982 mediation was adopted as one of the canons of civil litigation.  The 1982 Law on 
Civil Procedure created people’s mediation committees to handle civil disputes when prescribed by law 
and where parties sought such resolution voluntarily.  In 1980, cases handled by mediation committees 
exceeded, 10.8 times over, the number of civil cases adjudicated by the people’s court). 
 88. See id. at 1430. 
 89. See, e.g., STANLEY B. LUBMAN, Sino-American Relations and China’s Struggle for the Rule of 
Law, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION: COMMERCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 9, 
30 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., 2000); Fu, supra note 86, at 212-13 (1992); 
Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China after Deng Xianoping: “Mao and Mediation” 
Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229, 274 (1997); id. at 315. 
 90. See Chang Yi & Wang De-cheng, The Theoretical Debates of New China’s Litigation 
Conciliation, 2 J. KUNMING U. SCI. & TECH., Feb. 2010, at 21, 22. 
 91. Data comparing Chinese GDP to World GDP, WORLDBANK, http://databank.worldbank.org 
(select World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance; then follow the “next” 
hyperlink; then select regions “China” and “World”; then follow the “next” hyperlink; then select “GDP 
(current US$)”; then follow the “next” hyperlink; then select years 1978 through 2011; then follow the 
“next” hyperlink; then export the data). 
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in 2010.92  By the end of 2010, the economic aggregate of the People’s Republic of 
China, when converted to purchasing power parity (PPP), ranks second in the 
world, following only the United States.93 
This rapid economic development brought about many opportunities, but, at 
the same time, it also produced many disputes.  In the circumstances, although the 
rule of law must be emphasized in order to ensure that transactions are carried out 
and disputes are resolved effectively, the traditional Chinese culture still plays an 
important part in the society.  It is particularly felt in the field of dispute settlement, 
particularly the Chinese preference of mediation.  The Chinese mediation system 
after the 1980s can be divided into two stages: the stage of stressing mediation 
(from the enactment of the Civil Procedural Law (Trial Implementation) in 1982 to 
the enactment of the Civil Procedural Law in 1991) and the stage of voluntary 
mediation under the law (since the enactment of the Civil Procedural Law to the 
present).94  
Article 6 of the Civil Procedural Law (Trial Implementation) 1982 “stresses 
conciliation”: if conciliation efforts are ineffective, judgments should be issued 
without delay.95  In 1991, mediation appeared in the General Provisions of the Civil 
Procedural Law, and Chapter 8 provides that mediation is conducted voluntarily 
and in accordance with the rule of law.96  For example, Article 85 provides that “the 
people’s court shall, in handling civil cases, distinguish between right and wrong 
and conduct conciliation under the principle of voluntariness of the parties and on 
the basis of evidence facts.”97   Article 88 provides that “to reach agreement, both 
parties shall be voluntary and not be forced to do so, and the contents of mediation 
shall not be against the law.”98  Article 91 provides that “[i]f no agreement is 
reached through conciliation or if either party backs out of the settlement 
agreement before the conciliation statement is served, the people’s court shall 
render a judgment without delay.”99 
Following the approach and preference of the Chinese culture, legal and 
otherwise, a number of concrete measures have been taken by the Chinese 
government.  The creation of mediation bodies is an example.  In 1987, for 
instance, the Beijing Mediation Centre was set up, and in 2000 it was renamed the 
Mediation Centre of China’s Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. 
 93. Lesley Wroughton & Tim Ahmann, China ranks no. 2 in buying power, World Bank says, 
REUTERS, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/11/worldbank-china-
idUSN1145131520080411. 
 94. Jia Yuhaii, Brief Discussion of the Reform and Perfection of Court Mediation, LEGAL SYSTEM 
AND ECONOMY, no. 1, 2011, at 63 (original in Chinese). 
 95. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., on March 8, 1982, and implemented on a trial basis as of Oct. 1, 1982), 
art. 6, http://www.novexcn.com/civil_procedure_law.html (China). 
 96. See generally Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Order 
No. 44 of the President of the People's Republic of China on Apr. 9, 1991), ch. 8, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207339.htm (China). 
 97. Id. art. 85. 
 98. Id. art. 88. 
 99. Id. art. 91.  
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or the China Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC).100  The center handles 
cases based on the mediation agreements between parties and is staffed with 
mediators for parties to choose among.101  According to its Rules for Mediators, the 
function of mediation is to ensure justice and effectiveness.102  In the process of 
mediation, mediators should fully respect clients’ autonomy and rely on the 
determination of facts and responsibilities in accordance with the contract and 
relevant laws.103  
Mediation is also carried out in the proceedings of arbitration.  It has long been 
the practice of the China International Economic and Trade Commission 
(CIETAC) and other arbitration agencies to combine arbitration with mediation.104  
CIETAC can handle independent mediation cases and also offers mediation for 
cases brought to arbitration.105  Concerning the combination of arbitration and 
mediation, Article 45 of the Rules of Arbitration of China International Economic 
and Trade Commission of People’s Republic of China 2012 makes general 
provisions covering procedures and outcomes.106  This practice is in conformity 
with the general spirit of court mediation. 
The procedural mediation system is seen as the “oriental experience” by the 
international judiciary.107  Along with the enactment and implementation of 
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court about Several Issues Concerning the 
Civil Mediation Work of the People’s Court on December 14, 2004, China’s court 
mediation began to be institutionalized and normalized.108  Needless to say, 
mediation is also a unique feature of dispute resolution by administrative bodies 
and other institutions in China.  This cultural preference also has a clear bearing on 
dispute settlement concerning foreign investment.109 
                                                                                                     
 100. CHINA CHAMBER OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, MEDIATION CENTER: ABOUT US, 
http://adr.ccpit.org/english/typeinfo.aspx?t1=117&t2=123 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
 101. Id. 
 102. CHINA CHAMBER OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, MEDIATION CENTER: RULES, 
http://adr.ccpit.org/english/typeinfo.aspx?t1=119&t2=130 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
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Dispute Resolution in Mainland China, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 138 (2005). 
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 108. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court about Several Issues Concerning the Civil Mediation 
Work of the People’s Court (Sept. 16, 2004), http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3735.  
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471 (2006); George O. White III, Foreigners at the Gate: Sweeping Revolutionary Changes on the 
Central Kingdom’s Landscape—Foreign Direct Investment Regulations & Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms in the People’s Republic of China, 3 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 95, 132-135 (2003). 
 
2012] MEDIATION AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 229 
III. INFLUENCE OF TRADITIONAL CULTURE ON  
RESOLVING INVESTMENT DISPUTES IN CHINA 
Concerning investor-state dispute resolution, under the Chinese legal system, a 
foreign investor or foreign-invested enterprise may resort to administrative 
reconsideration , administrative litigation, or both.  According to the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 
1999,110 foreign investors or foreign-invested enterprises111 may apply for 
administrative reconsideration if they consider that certain specific administrative 
acts infringe upon their lawful rights or interests112 or that an administrative body 
has infringed upon their lawful decision-making power,113 imposed duties on them 
illegally,114 failed to deal with their applications, or protect their property rights.115 
When refusing to accept a specific administrative act, the applicant must apply 
for administrative reconsideration to either the people’s government at the same 
level,116 the competent department at the next higher level,117 the local people’s 
government at the next higher level,118 or the department under the State 
Council,119 depending on the circumstances.  The applicant may also claim for 
administrative compensation while applying for administrative reconsideration.120  
                                                                                                     
 110. Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), 
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/administration/administrative-
reconsideration-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-1999.html. 
 111. Under the Law on Administrative Reconsideration Law, the qualified applicants for 
administrative reconsideration are citizens, legal persons, or other organizations, and Article 41 
provides: “If foreigners, stateless persons, or foreign organizations are engaged in administrative 
reconsideration in the People's Republic of China, this Law shall be applied.”  Id. art. 41. 
 112. Id. art. 6, ¶ 11; see also id. art. 6, ¶¶ 1-4 (providing that such administrative acts may include, 
but are not limited to, decisions made by administrative organs to impose administrative penalties such 
as fines, confiscation of illegal gains, orders for suspension of production or business operations, and 
temporary suspension or rescission of licenses;  to impose on them compulsory administrative measures 
including sealing up, seizure or freezing of property; to alter, suspend or revoke such documents as 
permits, licenses and qualification certificates; or to infringe upon their right of ownership in or the right 
to the use of natural resources). 
 113. Id. art. 6, ¶ 5. 
 114. Id. art. 6, ¶ 7. 
 115. Id. art. 6, ¶ 9. 
 116. See id. art. 12 (providing that “ [a]n applicant, who refuses to accept a specific administrative 
act of the departments under local people's governments at or above the county level may apply for 
administrative reconsideration to the people's government at the same level; an applicant may also apply 
for administrative reconsideration to the competent authority at the next higher level”). 
 117. See id. (providing that “[a]n applicant, who refuses to accept a specific administrative act of an 
administrative organ, who carries out vertical management system, such as Customs, banking, tax 
collection, foreign exchange control, or by a State security organ, shall apply for administrative 
reconsideration to the competent authority at the next higher level”). 
 118. See id. art. 13 (providing that “[a] citizen, legal person, or any other organization that refuses to 
accept a specific administrative act of local people's governments at various levels shall apply for 
administrative reconsideration to the local people's government at the next higher level”). 
 119. See id. art. 14 (providing that when refusing to accept a specific administrative act taken by a 
department under the State Council or by the people’s government of a province, autonomous region or 
municipality directly under the Central Government, the applicant shall apply to the said departments or 
people’s government for administrative reconsideration). 
 120. Id. art. 29. 
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A decision made after administrative reconsideration which changes a specific 
administrative act shall be enforced by the administrative reconsideration body 
according to law, or an application shall be made to a People’s Court for 
compulsory enforcement.121 
A foreign investor or foreign-invested enterprise, if unsatisfied with a decision 
of administrative reconsideration, may submit the dispute to a People’s Court.122  
Foreigners, stateless persons, and foreign organizations conducting administrative 
litigation in China usually enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same 
obligations as Chinese citizens and organizations.  However, where a court of a 
foreign country restricts the administrative litigation rights of Chinese citizens and 
organizations, the Chinese court will apply the principle of reciprocity to the 
administrative litigation rights of citizens and organizations of that country.123  In 
addition, foreign plaintiffs can only appoint Chinese lawyers as their agents ad 
litem.124  Differently from civil disputes, mediation will not be conducted for 
administrative lawsuits.125 
Where it is found by the court that the specific administrative act was taken in 
circumstances where the evidence was insufficient, laws and regulations were 
incorrectly applied, statutory procedures were violated, or the related 
administrative organ acted beyond its authority or abused its powers, the People’s 
Court will annul the act and order the administrative body to make another specific 
                                                                                                     
 121. Id. art. 33, ¶¶ 1-2. 
 122. See id. art. 30.   
Where a citizen, legal person, or other organization believes that the specific 
administrative act taken by an administrative organ infringes upon his or its right of 
ownership in or right to the use of natural resources such as land, mineral resources, 
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reconsideration, he or it may bring an administrative lawsuit before a People’s Court 
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Id.   
The decisions made after administrative reconsideration by the people’s governments of 
provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government 
confirming the right of ownership in or the right to the use of natural resources such as 
land, mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains or hills, grasslands, wasteland, tidal 
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Council or by the people’s government of a province, when refusing to accept a decision made after 
administrative reconsideration, the applicant may bring an administrative lawsuit before a People’s 
Court, or apply to the State Council for a ruling, and any such ruling made by the State Council shall be 
final). 
 123. Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Order 
No. 16 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1989, and effective Oct. 1 1990), art. 
71, http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/administration/administrative-
procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-1990.html. 
 124. See id. art. 73. 
 125. See id art. 50.  Contra id. art 67 (providing that mediation may be conducted in the proceedings 
of an administrative lawsuit regarding claims for damages). 
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administrative act.126  However, it is worth noting that only specific administrative 
acts are adjudicable in China.  In other words, Chinese courts will not hear cases 
involving those administrative laws and regulations or  administrative authority 
decisions or orders that have general application, or any State acts related to 
national defense or foreign affairs.127  Therefore, if a foreign-invested enterprise 
considers its right or interest has been impaired by the regulations of an 
administrative organ, it may not get a desired remedy through administrative 
litigation.  This is also the case even if it brings a lawsuit on the specific 
administrative act made according to the above-mentioned laws or regulations, as 
the courts are, under Chinese law, obliged to enforce the laws and regulations 
adopted by authorized bodies.128 
Restricting the power of judicial review to specific administrative acts is a 
distinct feature of Chinese law.  This may not, however, have adverse effects on the 
resolution of disputes involving foreign investors and Chinese governmental bodies 
because most such disputes concern specific acts of the government rather than the 
general application of laws.129  Even if a given dispute relates to the application of a 
law or administrative regulation, where the issue is its application to specific cases 
rather than the law or administrative regulation itself, the court will have judicial 
review power.130  In China, therefore, what matters in practice is how the laws and 
regulations are actually implemented.  
To resolve disputes with foreign investors without resorting to litigation, 
mechanisms such as complaint centers, mediation panels, and working panels have 
been established at different administrative levels throughout China.131  Some of 
these have been established within the local administrative bodies in charge of 
foreign trade and investment, while others are affiliated with the local associations 
of foreign investors, with staff assigned by the local governments.132  In fact, as 
early as the 1980s, the Chinese government had paid special attention to disputes 
with foreign investors.133  Where environmental considerations, city planning, or 
public concerns meant that a foreign investment project had to be relocated, instead 
of paying compensation the Chinese government on many occasions helped the 
                                                                                                     
 126. See id. art. 54, ¶ 2. 
 127. See id. art. 12, ¶¶ 1-4. 
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at 370-71 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xiancu, eds., 1997). 
 133. See WANG, supra note 130, at 1-2. 
232 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
foreign investors find another location for the project and offered more preferential 
terms.134 
The Ministry of Commerce also promulgated, in 2006, the Interim Measures 
on Complaints from Foreign-invested Enterprises (“Interim Measures”),135 
according to which foreign-invested enterprises or foreign investors who deem that 
their legitimate rights or interests have been infringed upon by an administrative 
authority may file a complaint with the complaint acceptance authority for 
coordination or settlement.  The Interim Measures establish a National Complaint 
Center for Foreign-invested Enterprises responsible for handling complaints 
directly filed with it, trans-provincial complaints, and complaints with great 
influence.136  The Interim Measures also stipulate that local complaint acceptance 
authorities shall be responsible for accepting complaints from foreign-invested 
enterprises or foreign investors within their locality and any complaints transferred 
from or supervised by the National Complaint Center.137  In addition, a Complaint 
Coordination Office for Foreign-invested Enterprises was established to coordinate 
and supervise the work of the National Complaint Center and the local complaint 
authorities as well as to handle complaints involving different sectors or industries 
which need to be settled through trans-ministerial coordination meetings.138  In 
order to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, a complaint which is being, or has been, 
handled through the process of administrative reconsideration, litigation, or 
arbitration may not be handled by the complaint centers.139  
Treaties and agreements that China has entered into also encourage amicable 
settlement, although investor-state arbitration has become a norm for both BITs and 
free trade agreements (FTAs).  For instance, the China–New Zealand FTA 
authorizes investors to make use of ICSID conciliation or UNCITRAL arbitration 
procedures.140  Before availing themselves of international arbitration, however, 
investors must give three months advance notice to the state party.141  The purpose 
of this provision is to allow the host country to require the use of its domestic 
administrative review procedures.142  The administrative review process, in any 
event, may not exceed three months.  Host countries always encourage investors to 
submit their disputes to local courts, but investors in most cases prefer international 
arbitration.  Under the China–New Zealand FTA, an investor that has submitted its 
dispute to a local court of the host country may later decide to resort to 
international arbitration, provided that it has withdrawn its case from the local court 
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before a final judgment is reached.143  This arrangement stands in sharp contrast to 
that established under the China–Pakistan FTA and reflects the changes in China’s 
attitude towards international arbitration that occurred in the interim.  The China–
New Zealand FTA also has detailed rules on arbitration procedures that have the 
effect of modifying the domestic laws of the parties as well as ICSID’s normal 
procedures.144  One such modification is that the statute of limitations for the 
submission of disputes must be within three years from “the time at which the 
disputing investor became aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of a 
breach of obligation” by the host country which has “caus[ed] loss or damage to the 
investor or its investments.”145 
The measures that China has taken are much influenced by and, hence, in 
harmony with the traditional Chinese culture.  These measures have proven to be 
quite effective in resolving disputes with foreign investors without going through 
the complicated and  usually long-lasting proceedings of arbitration.  The question 
then is whether the Chinese experience can be translated into other cultures. 
IV. THE FUTURE FOR INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Arbitration is a more desirable means for resolving commercial disputes 
compared to court proceedings.  Insofar as investment dispute resolution is 
concerned, however, arbitration has its own weaknesses.  For instance, there is a 
widely recognized doctrine called “competence-competence” in international 
commercial arbitration, which means that arbitrators have the power to determine 
their own jurisdiction.146  It is questionable that the arbitrators would be less 
objective on challenges to their own jurisdiction where they have a financial 
interest in sustaining it.147  During the first twenty-six years of ICSID’s history, 
jurisdiction was not once denied.148  A 1986 study of the first seven decisions on 
jurisdiction by ICSID tribunals indicated that 
the case law demonstrates, above all, that objections to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre have met with little success.  ICSID tribunals have shown a consistent 
tendency to decide that the Centre has jurisdiction over disputes, notwithstanding 
an ambiguous arbitration agreement. . . . Despite the complexities of jurisdiction 
that can arise . . . ICSID tribunals have interpreted arbitration agreements 
expansively to cover all aspects of the investment and to afford all parties in 
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interest the protections of the Convention.149 
The autonomy enjoyed by disputing parties in designating the governing law is 
one of the distinctive elements of arbitration.  Yet, arbitrators may, if the 
circumstances require, need to take public policy and mandatory national laws into 
consideration.  In such cases, not only could the parties’ express choice of law be 
derogated, but the instability and uncertainty of international arbitration also would 
increase.150  This on the one hand is important for the protection of foreign 
investments.  On the other hand, however, it may—and practice demonstrates that 
it does—tend to ignore the interests of host states.  In these circumstances, 
mediation may serve as an alternative to arbitration. 
Mediation has been widely used for resolving international commercial 
disputes by private actors.  Mediation clauses, in addition to or instead of 
arbitration agreements, are increasingly common in private contracts.151  One 
survey of American business professionals show that they prefer mediation to 
arbitration.152  Recently, mediation has played a successful role in resolving the 
disputes over the “Lehman mini-bonds” in Hong Kong.153  Under the Lehman-
Brothers-related Investment Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme,  
as of 18 February 2009, a total of 105 requests for mediation [had] been made. . . . 
Some 10 cases [had] been settled by direct negotiations between the investors and 
the banks after mediation was requested.  In 10 other cases mediation proceeded 
and in all of these cases settlement agreements were concluded.154  
Notwithstanding countries that have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention 
oninvestor-state arbitration, mediation has seldom been used in investor-state 
disputes under the ICSID regime.  In its history, there are only two conciliations---
and one of them was successfully completed in 1985.155  Among the other 166 
cases concluded, the parties of thirty-five cases reached settlement agreements and 
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the arbitration proceedings were thus discontinued, in four cases settlements 
reached by the parties were recorded in the form of awards, and in five cases the 
awards embodied the parties’ settlement agreement.156  This is because even the 
winning parties may not necessarily welcome the arbitral awards.  In Metalclad v. 
Mexico, the investor was awarded nearly $17 million, 80 percent less than  
expected.157  Grant Kesler, Metalclad’s former CEO, complained that the process 
was “too slow, too costly, and too indeterminate . . . [and] . . . he wished he had 
merely entrusted his company’s fate to informal mechanisms.”158 
Is mediation a better choice? Mediation is usually much cheaper than 
arbitration.159  Many mediators regard mediation as a social service, and they may 
even waive the mediation fee or merely charge a nominal fee.160  This is in sharp 
contrast with arbitration where fees are either calculated on the basis of the claim 
amount or hourly rate.  Mediation procedures are informal and flexible in which the 
disputing parties have discretion to reach a quick solution.   
The most important advantage of mediation compared with litigation and 
arbitration is the almost complete autonomy of the disputing parties.  Parties 
directly and actively participate in the communication and negotiation during 
mediation, and choose and control the substantive norms for decision-making.  The 
mediation process is more like a business-type negotiation unlike the mandatory 
decision-making by a court or arbitration tribunal.161  Unlike judges and arbitrators, 
a mediator is not the ultimate decision maker; rather, the mediator works together 
with the parties to find a mutually acceptable solution.162  Unlike judges and 
arbitrators, mediators do not need to be jurispathic as their role is to persuade each 
party to focus on its genuine interests rather than its contractual or legal 
entitlement.163  Thus, mediation can reduce tension and hostility between the 
disputing parties and create an amicable atmosphere during the whole dispute 
settlement process.  Unlike the winning or losing situation in litigation and 
arbitration processes, mediation aims at a win-win settlement, in which a legal 
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dispute may be transformed into a restructured relationship.164  Because of the 
above, to use mediation as a means in resolving disputes is likely to preserve the 
business relationship between disputing parties during and after the dispute 
settlement process.  A survey of inside counsel, outside counsel, and non-lawyer 
executives shows that 80 percent of the respondents agreed that mediation 
preserves business relationships.165  
Mediation is so effective in resolving commercial disputes, and especially 
cross-border disputes, because conflicts usually arise due to misconceptions and 
misunderstandings.166  Mediation enables disputing parties to talk directly to each 
other and to clarify their misconceptions and misunderstanding to find a solution 
together.  The confidential setting of mediation provides the parties with further 
assurance  that openly participating in mediation will not affect the participants in 
later proceedings.167  Because parties are actively involved in the mediation process 
and their special concerns are fully communicated, the result is more predictable.  
After a successful mediation, the parties may enter a settlement agreement.  Such 
voluntary agreement almost always yields voluntary compliance.168  
In conclusion, the globalization of the world today has made all nations highly 
dependent upon each other.  Due to different cultures and legal systems among 
countries, however,  parties’ misconceptions and misunderstandings result in 
disputes that affect economic exchanges, including foreign investment .  Unless 
such disputes are resolved efficiently and effectively, economic exchanges will 
suffer.  Also with the deepening of globalization and evolving forms and methods 
of economic exchange, certain means of dispute resolution that were effective in 
the past may not be equally effective today.  The experience of investment dispute 
resolution is an example.  In the past, many considered arbitration to be the most 
desirable way to resolve investment disputes.  With the ever increasing 
contradictory decisions in investor-state arbitration, however, many have begun to 
think that mediation should be adopted, at least as an alternative for resolving 
investor-state disputes.  In this regard, because mediation is rooted in Asian culture, 
the Asian people—in particular scholars in the field—have a duty to make it work. 
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